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Here’s an edited and finalized version of your report with grammatical corrections and the necessary observations, impact, and remediation sections:


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Service Account and GKE Cluster Review Report

Date: October 15, 2024

Subject: GKE Cluster and Service Account Review – Permissions and OAuth Scopes Audit


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Overview:

A review has been conducted on the GKE configuration, which revealed that the cluster in scope did not follow the principle of least privilege. The OAuth access scope available to nodes was not limited, resulting in broad access to the GCP platform. Specifically, the cluster was configured with nodes that had privileged access to GCP resources.

Additionally, we reviewed the service account attached to the GKE cluster and identified the following IAM policies and permissions:

1. logging.logEntries.create


2. monitoring.metricDescriptors.list


3. monitoring.timeSeries.create


4. stackdriver.resourceMetadata.write



While no immediate threat was identified within the IAM policy permissions, the OAuth access scope poses a significant risk due to its broad access capabilities.


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Observations:

1. Broad OAuth Access Scope:
The OAuth scope attached to the nodes allowed full access to the GCP platform, which is considered excessive. This poses a security risk if the node is compromised.


2. IAM Permissions:
The assigned permissions (listed above) may not be immediately dangerous but could pose a risk in the context of a compromised service account:

logging.logEntries.create can be used to alter or hide logs, obscuring any malicious activity.

monitoring.metricDescriptors.list and monitoring.timeSeries.create can be used to manipulate monitoring data or falsify system health metrics.

stackdriver.resourceMetadata.write allows unauthorized modification of resource metadata, potentially leading to system misconfigurations.



3. Principle of Least Privilege Not Followed:
The current configuration violates the principle of least privilege, increasing the likelihood of privileged escalation if the service account or node is compromised.




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Impact:

The broad OAuth scope enables unrestricted access to multiple GCP resources, which significantly increases the risk of data breaches, unauthorized access, and potential system compromise.

Improper permissions, such as log manipulation and resource metadata modification, could make it difficult to detect and mitigate unauthorized access, leaving the system vulnerable to long-term exploitation.

Failing to follow the principle of least privilege increases the attack surface and provides more opportunities for malicious actors to exploit any compromised service accounts or nodes.



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Conclusion:

The current GKE cluster configuration and associated service account permissions expose the environment to significant risks. While no immediate vulnerabilities were found in the IAM policies, the OAuth access scope presents a clear threat to the integrity of the platform. Immediate action should be taken to reduce the scope and implement more restrictive permissions.


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Remediation Recommendations:

1. Restrict OAuth Scopes:
Limit the OAuth scopes available to the nodes to the minimum required. Avoid using broad scopes like cloud-platform. Instead, assign granular scopes that only provide necessary access to specific APIs.


2. Review IAM Policies:

Remove unnecessary permissions such as stackdriver.resourceMetadata.write.

Consider restricting logging and monitoring permissions to prevent potential log obfuscation or metric tampering.



3. Implement the Principle of Least Privilege:
Ensure that the service account and nodes are assigned only the permissions required to perform their intended functions. Regularly review and update the permissions to keep the access controlled and minimal.


4. Monitor and Audit Regularly:
Set up regular audits of service account permissions and OAuth scopes. Additionally, ensure that detailed logging and monitoring are in place to detect any unauthorized activities.




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Next Steps:

Implement the proposed remediation steps.

Perform a follow-up audit after the changes are made to verify the reduction in risk and the effectiveness of the applied security measures.



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Prepared by:
[Your Name]
Security Analyst


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Let me know if you need further adjustments!